PREAMBLE TO THE TREATY
"The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as 'the
States Parties'),
Welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of
recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in
arsenals of nuclear weapons, as well as in the field of the prevention of
nuclear proliferation in all its aspects,
Underlining the importance of the full and prompt implementation of
such agreements and measures,
Convinced that the present international situation provides an
opportunity to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament
and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and
declaring their intention to take such measures,
Stressing therefore the need for continued systematic and progressive
efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of
eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control,
Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions
and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and
qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of
advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects,
Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will
thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic
process to achieve nuclear disarmament,
Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear
testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and
effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which has
long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international
community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation,
Noting the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of
nuclear weapons for all time,
Noting also the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to
the protection of the environment,
Affirming the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to
this Treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention
of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process
of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international
peace and security,
Have agreed as follows:..."
Scope of the Treaty
Under article 1 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: "1. Each State
Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any
other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear
explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. 2. Each State
party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in
any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion."
Adoption and signature of the Treaty
Negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty began at the
Conference on Disarmament at Geneva in January 1994. The final draft,
sponsored by 127 States, was submitted to the United Nations General
Assembly two years later and adopted on 10 September 1996. The Treaty was
opened for signature on 24 September 1996 at United Nations Headquarters in
New York.
Arrangements until entry into force
At a meeting of States Signatories on 19 November 1996, a Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization was
established. The Preparatory Commission is an international organization
financed by the States Signatories, which has been set up to establish the
global verification regime of the Treaty and to prepare for its entry into
force. The Preparatory Commission consists of two organs: a plenary body
composed of all the States Signatories - also known as the Preparatory
Commission - and the Provisional Technical Secretariat.
Preparatory Commission
The Preparatory Commission appointed Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany as its
Executive Secretary on 3 March 1997. The Executive Secretary is head of the
Provisional Technical Secretariat, which started work at its offices in the
Vienna International Centre on 17 March 1997.
The Preparatory Commission has three subsidiary bodies: Working Group A on
administrative and budgetary matters, Working Group B on verification
issues, and the Advisory Group on financial, budgetary and associated
administrative issues. The working groups make proposals and recommendations
for consideration and adoption by the Preparatory Commission at its plenary
sessions.
Verification of the Treaty
The Treaty has a Protocol under which an International Monitoring System
(IMS) and an International Data Centre (IDC) are being established as part
of the global verification regime foreseen under article IV (Verification).
IMS will consist of a global network of 321 monitoring stations, as well as
16 laboratories, capable of detecting nuclear explosions worldwide. This
network of 170 seismic, 80 radionuclide, 60 infrasound and 11 hydroacoustic
stations, as well as 16 radionuclide laboratories - comprising a total of
337 facilities - will supply data for processing and analysis to IDC. Both
the raw and processed data will be available to all the States parties. If a
suspicious occurrence cannot be resolved through consultation and
clarification, each State party has the right to request an on-site
inspection.
Entry into force of the Treaty
Under article XIV (Entry into force), the Treaty will not enter into force
until it has been signed and ratified by the 44 States listed in annex 2 to
the Treaty. This list comprises the States that formally participated in the
1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament, and that appear in table l of
the December 1995 edition of "Nuclear Research Reactors in the World" and
table l of the April 1996 edition of "Nuclear Power Reactors in the World",
both compiled by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
If the Treaty has not entered into force "three years after the date of the
anniversary of its opening for signature", a conference of those States that
have already ratified it may be held to decide what measures may be taken to
accelerate the ratification process and to facilitate the Treaty's entry
into force.
History of the Treaty
The Treaty is the culmination of 40 years of efforts. In April 1954, almost
10 years after the first nuclear weapon test was conducted in July 1945,
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India proposed that nuclear weapon
testing be suspended. His proposal was the first initiative of its kind.
The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibited all nuclear explosions in the
atmosphere, in outer space and under water, but not underground. The
Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 limited the yield of underground nuclear
weapon tests to 150 kilotons (the equivalent of the explosive force of
approximately 150,000 tonnes of trinitrotoluene (TNT)).
Over 2,000 nuclear weapon test explosions were registered during the 51
years between the conduct of the first nuclear test and the opening for
signature of the Treaty in September 1996.
SUMMARY OF THE TREATY
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty consists of a preamble, 17
articles, two annexes and a Protocol. The Protocol describes verification
procedures and contains two annexes. One annex lists the 337 facilities
comprising the International Monitoring System (IMS) and the other annex
describes parameters for standard event screening by the International Data
Centre (IDC).
Scope
The preamble stresses the need for "continued systematic and progressive
efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally" with the ultimate goal of their
elimination and of "general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control". It recognizes that "the cessation of all
nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions ...
constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation in all its aspects".
Under article I (Basic Obligations): "1. Each State party undertakes not to
carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion,
and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under
its jurisdiction or control. 2. Each State party undertakes, furthermore, to
refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the
carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion."
Implementing organization
Article II (The Organization) establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organization to ensure the Treaty's implementation and provide a
forum for consultation and cooperation. With its seat in Vienna, it will
comprise three organs. The Conference of the States Parties will oversee the
Treaty's implementation and the activities of the other two organs. The
Executive Council, with a membership of 51 States parties, will be the
principal decision-making body of the Organization and responsible for
supervising its activities. The Technical Secretariat, headed by a
Director-General, will assist States parties to implement the Treaty and
carry out verification and other functions. It will supervise and coordinate
the operation of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and operate the
International Data Centre (IDC) at Vienna.
Article III (National implementation measures) requires each State party to
take any necessary measures to implement its obligations under the Treaty,
including the establishment of a National Authority for liaison with the
Organization and other States parties.
Verification and compliance
Article IV (Verification) and the Protocol establish the verification
regime. Such a regime - consisting of IMS, IDC, consultation and
clarification, on-site inspections and confidence-building measures - "shall
be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty" at its
entry into force.
Verification activities should be based on objective information, limited to
the subject matter of the Treaty, and carried out on the basis of full
respect for the sovereignty of States parties and in the least intrusive
manner possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of
their objectives. Each State party, however, "shall refrain from any abuse
of the right of verification".
International Monitoring System. The purpose of IMS is to detect and
identify nuclear explosions prohibited under article I. As set out in annex
1 to the Protocol, IMS will consist of 50 primary and 120 auxiliary
seismological stations equipped to detect seismic activity and distinguish
between natural events - such as earthquakes - and nuclear explosions. It
will also include 80 radionuclide stations - 40 of them capable of detecting
noble gases - designed to identify radioactive particles released during a
nuclear explosion. The radionuclide stations will be supported by 16
laboratories. In addition, 60 infrasound and 11 hydroacoustic stations will
be designed to pick up the sound of a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere or
under water, respectively.
International Date Centre. The monitoring stations will transmit data
to the International Data Centre (IDC) at Vienna. As set out in part I of
the Protocol, IDC will produce integrated lists of all signals detected by
IMS, as well as standard event lists and bulletins, and screened event
bulletins that filter out events that appear to be of a non-nuclear nature.
Both raw and processed information will be available to all States parties.
Consultation and clarification. The consultation and clarification
component of the verification regime encourages States parties to attempt to
resolve, either among themselves or through the Organization, ambiguous
events before requesting an on-site inspection. A State party must provide
clarification of an ambiguous event within 48 hours of receiving such a
request from another State party or the Executive Council.
On-site inspection. If the matter cannot be resolved through
consultation and clarification, each State party can request an on-site
inspection. The procedures for on-site inspections, which "shall be carried
out in the area where the event that triggered the on-site inspection
request occurred" are established in part II of the Protocol.
Confidence-building measures. To reduce the likelihood that
verification data may be misinterpreted, each State party will voluntarily
notify the Technical Secretariat of any single chemical explosion using 300
tonnes or more of TNT-equivalent blasting material on its territory. In
order to calibrate the stations of IMS, each State party may liaise with the
Technical Secretariat in carrying out chemical calibration explosions or
providing information on chemical explosions planned for other purposes.
Article V (Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance,
including sanctions) empowers the Conference to revoke a State's rights
under the Treaty, to recommend to States parties collective measures in
conformity with international law, or, alternatively, if the case is urgent,
to bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations.
Disputes
Article VI (Settlement of disputes) describes the mechanisms by which
disputes concerning the application or interpretation of the Treaty may be
settled. Subject to certain conditions, the International Court of Justice
may be requested to give an advisory opinion.
Amendments and review
Article VII (Amendments) gives each State party the right to propose
amendments to the Treaty, the Protocol or the annexes to the Protocol at any
time after the Treaty's entry into force. The proposed amendment requires
the approval of a majority of States parties at an amendment conference with
no party casting a negative vote.
Article VIII (Review of the Treaty) stipulates that a conference to review
the operation and effectiveness of the Treaty will be held 10 years after
its entry into force, "unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States
Parties". Such review would take into account "any new scientific and
technological developments". Further review conferences may be held with the
same objective at intervals of 10 years thereafter, or less, if the
Conference so decides in the preceding year.
At the request of any State party, the conference may "consider the
possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes". If it permits such explosions by consensus, then the
review conference "shall commence work without delay, with a view to
recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that
shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions".
Duration and withdrawal
Article IX (Duration and withdrawal) states that the Treaty is of unlimited
duration.
Other provisions
The next four articles (X, XI, XII and XIII) deal with the status of the
Protocol and the annexes; signature; ratification; and accession.
Entry into force
Under article XIV (Entry into force), the Treaty will enter into force 180
days after the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty have deposited
their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, "but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for
signature". This list comprises the States that formally participated in the
1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament, and that appear in table 1 of
the December 1995 edition of "Nuclear Research Reactors in the World" and
table 1 of the April 1996 edition of "Nuclear Power Reactors in the World",
both compiled by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
If the Treaty has not entered into force "three years after the date of the
anniversary of its opening for signature", the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, as Depositary of the Treaty, could, at the request of a
majority of States that had ratified it, convene a conference to examine the
situation and to "decide by consensus what measures consistent with
international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process"
in order to facilitate the Treaty's early entry into force.
Additional provisions
Article XV (Reservations) states that the Treaty's provisions are not
subject to reservations.
Article XVI (Depositary) establishes the Secretary-General of the United
Nations as the Treaty's Depositary.
Under article XVII (Authentic texts), the Treaty texts in Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish are equally authentic.
Protocol
Part I describes the International Monitoring System (IMS) and outlines the
functions of the International Data Centre (IDC).
Part II sets up the procedures for on-site inspections. It specifies the
process of designation of inspectors and inspection assistants, their
privileges and immunities, points of entry, arrangements for use of
non-scheduled aircraft, approved inspection equipment, on-site inspection
requests, inspection mandate and notification of inspection. Pre-inspection
activities and the conduct of inspections are described in detail.
Part III deals with confidence-building measures under article IV
(Verification) of the Treaty.
Further information can be obtained from:
Public Information Section
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO PrepCom)
Vienna International Centre
P.O. Box 1200, A-1400 Vienna, Austria
Telephone: +43 1 26030 6200
Facsimile: +43 1 26030 5877
E-mail: info@ctbto.org