ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING OF RADIOXENON IN SUPPORT OF THE RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

The Automated Radioxenon Analyzer/Sampler (ARSA) has been deployed at several locations throughout the world: Richland, WA; New York City, NY; Charlottesville, VA; Freiburg, Germany; and, most recently, Guangzhou, China. In each of these locations, the ARSA has measured varying concentrations of ^{131m}Xe, ¹³³Xe, ^{133m}Xe, and ¹³⁵Xe. These concentrations of radioxenon come from a variety of sources such as nuclear reactors, medical hospitals, and nuclear fuel reprocessing; the concentrations vary by location. This makes it necessary to utilize the isotope ratios as well as their concentrations to differentiate ambient radioxenon emissions from those released by clandestine underground nuclear explosions. High concentrations and multiple isotope identification within a single sample are good measures of potentially suspect radioxenon emissions. Utilizing the ratios of the concentrations of ¹³⁵Xe to ¹³³Xe and ¹³³Xe to ^{133m}Xe enhances the separation of the more mundane emissions from clandestine underground nuclear detonations. This paper presents concentration data collected from each of the sites and explores the ability of ratios to discriminate between reactor effluents and underground nuclear tests. Analyses to date indicate that concentration levels, multiple radioxenon isotopes in a single sample, the presence of ^{133m}Xe and several isotopic ratios will all be good indicators of clandestine underground nuclear explosions and the combination of two or more of these measures will provide strong evidence of such activities.

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OBJECTIVE

Several versions of the ARSA, developed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), have been deployed at several locations throughout the world during the past five years. Deployments were first undertaken at the Environmental Monitoring Laboratory (EML) in New York City during 1997 (Bowyer 1997), second in Orlando, Florida in 1999, and third in Freiburg, Germany in 1999-2001 (Bowyer 2002). Additional systems were run in Orlando Florida and Charlottesville, VA in 2001-2002 with one of the units deployed in Guangzhou, China in late July 2002; a PNNL model has run continually in Richland, WA area since May of 2001. All systems have measured ¹³³Xe and ¹³⁵Xe, which represent two of the three most important radioxenon isotopes that are indicative of a nuclear explosion. In some locations, concentrations of ^{131m}Xe have been measured and less frequently ^{133m}Xe has been measured.

These measured radioxenon concentrations represent an ambient background that will be present at some of the planned deployment locations outlined by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS). These emissions can be attributed to nuclear power reactor operations, hospital use of ¹³³Xe for medical testing, and fuel reprocessing activities to a lesser extent (Bowyer and Perkins 1998). In all instances the measured concentrations for ¹³³Xe have been well above the 1 mBq/m³ minimum detectable concentration (MDC) requirement adopted by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission (Preparatory 1999). For several of the deployed locations (Florida, Charlottesville, Germany, and New York City) the ARSA, which has a ¹³³Xe MDC below 0.2 mBq/m³, had a significant number of samples with ¹³³Xe concentrations above the 0.2 mBq/m³ MDC level. For the samples collected and measured in the Freiburg, Germany location over 95% had a detection of ¹³³Xe, see Figure 1. Though no MDC's have been set for ¹³¹mXe and ^{133m}Xe the PTS required that any of the deployed system be capable of measuring them and the ARSA has achieved MDC's for the two metastable isotopes of less than 0.3 mBq/m³ and for ¹³⁵Xe below 1.0 mBq/m³.

The measured concentrations and the identification of multiple isotopes within a single sample at all of the sampling locations merited further analysis of the data to determine the isotopic ratios from non-nuclear detonation sources. In the cases of multiple isotopes, the ¹³⁵Xe/¹³³Xe ratio clearly indicated that the plumes were from a source other than a nuclear explosion. The further absence of statistically significant amounts of ^{133m}Xe also provided a key indication that the plumes were from background sources. The most recent set of data obtained in Richland, Washington illustrates the identification problem; through the use of isotope identification and the ¹³⁵Xe/¹³³Xe ratio, the collected sample in Richland has been unambiguously assigned to the local nuclear reactor.

The discussion here is centered on nuclear reactor emissions, but it is important to point out that the two other likely sources of radioxenon isotopes will have unique ratios as well. For both medical uses and fuel processing activities the ^{131m}Xe/¹³³Xe plays an important role. For medical uses, only ¹³³Xe is used and 20 mCi is the typical dose used. These samples also contain ~0.5% ^{131m}Xe concentrations upon arrival (within 5 days of generation). After several weeks the ratio of ^{131m}Xe/¹³³Xe becomes very large (>> 10:1) and samples that are not used will be released to the atmosphere as part of the disposal process. For nuclear fuel reprocessing the ^{131m}Xe/¹³³Xe ratio will also be high because it is stored for several months to allow the decay of short-lived radionuclides before it is processed. Both of these activities will not have significant ¹³⁵Xe or ^{133m}Xe concentrations.

RESEARCH ACCOMPLISHED

Monitoring ambient levels of some radioxenons has a long history and the introduction of the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty in 1996 increased the interest in measuring atmospheric concentrations of the four radioxenons that are most likely to escape from an underground nuclear explosion and last long enough to be measured by a world wide radioxenon network. Historically, both anthropogenic and cosmogenic sources of these radioxenon isotopes were investigated and initial work indicated that concentrations from even small (1kT) subsurface nuclear explosions would be much greater than those produced by other means (Bowyer and Perkins 1998). Figure 2 shows the ¹³³Xe/¹³³Xe and ¹³⁵Xe/¹³³Xe ratios that are expected for an operating nuclear reactor in equilibrium and those expected for an underground nuclear explosion. It is clear that the ratios are several orders of magnitude higher for a nuclear detonation than they are for a nuclear reactor.

New York City 1997

The first reported environmental measurement of 135Xe concentration were taken by the first prototype ARSA unit at the Environmental Monitoring Laboratory in New York City during April of 1997(see Figure 3). The 135Xe/133Xe ratio for this sample was 0.13 and, along with the lack of any measurable 133mXe concentration, indicates that this plume was from a local reactor, Xe-133 concentrations were also seen during this field test.

Freiburg Germany (1999-2001)

The PTS Phase II testing was done at the Institute for Atmospheric Research (IAR) and included systems from Sweden (SAUNA), France (SPALAX), Russia (ARIX) and the ARSA system. IAR hosted the test and provided analysis of the archived samples that each of the systems collected. Comparisons of the concentration data from each of the systems were in good agreement with one another and will be detailed in a subsequent publication.

During this test the ambient concentrations of ¹³³Xe fluctuated between approximately 1.0 and 120 mBq/m³ on a daily basis (see Figure 1). Xenon-135 was seen in several of the samples during the 15-month test and the other two isotopes of interest ^{131m}Xe and ^{133m}Xe were seen as well. For one of the samples collected during this time a ¹³⁵Xe/¹³³Xe ratio of 2.1 was measured, which is almost four times higher than that expected for a nuclear reactor operating in equilibrium. This was a clear indication that additional reactor operations analysis was required to account for a sample that was not from an underground nuclear detonation.

High ratios of 131m Xe/ 133 Xe were seen on two occasions, which indicates either a release from a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant or a release of an old (>2 months) medical sample of 133 Xe by a nearby hospital.

Richland 2001

The running of the ARSA system in Richland has typically yielded radioxenon concentrations below the MDC levels of the system. Low radioxenon concentrations are expected in several of the PTS radionuclide station locations in the Southern Hemisphere due to the low numbers of nuclear reactors

The Richland location of the ARSA offers a unique test ground for ratios as it is in very close proximity of a nuclear reactor run by Columbia Generating Station (the WNP-II 2-GW BWR is less than 8 miles from the sampling station) with a prevailing wind direction blowing effluents away from the sampling site. During July of 2002, the reactor had a scheduled shutdown for biannual maintenance and refueling. A spike of ¹³³Xe and ¹³⁵Xe was seen at the sampling site within hours of reactor shutdown. The ¹³³Xe concentration was fairly low (0.74 mBq/m³) and the ¹³⁵Xe concentration was (3.1 mBq/m³), which was high for the Richland area, as ¹³⁵Xe had not been detected previously. This gave a ¹³⁵Xe/¹³³Xe ratio of ~4.2, which is the highest that has been measured by the ARSA. There were no measurable quantities of ^{133m}Xe or ^{131m}Xe found in the two samples that had the ¹³³Xe and ¹³⁵Xe. With the high ratio of ¹³⁵Xe/¹³³Xe and the lack of ^{133m}Xe, the samples indicate the source was a nuclear reactor that was not in equilibrium.

These results are consistent with results obtained by irradiation of 10.1 grams of HEU using a 9.0 x 10⁸ neutron/sec PuBe source at PNNL. The HEU was sealed in a gastight container, irradiated for several days and, thus, provided ¹³³Xe and ¹³⁵Xe. The head gas was drawn off and directly injected into the ARSA beta cells to provide calibration data for the beta energies (see Figure 4). The ¹³³Xe/¹³⁵Xe ratio ranges between 6 and 10, and depends on how soon the sample is injected into the ARSA detector after irradiation and the length of the irradiation.

Nuclear Reactor Shutdown

During a reactor shutdown the rapid decrease in the neutron flux allows the buildup of ¹³⁵Xe within the fuel rods, i.e. the ¹³⁵Xe is no longer being burned. Thermal stresses related to the reactor cool down facilitate the release of the trapped radioxenons within the fuel rods. Figure 5 shows the increase in the ¹³⁵Xe after shutdown of the reactor. The concentration peaks after about 10 hours by a factor of approximately 20 from normal operations; thus the ¹³⁵Xe/¹³³Xe ratio will go from about 0.5 to 10 during the first day after shutdown. The July 28, 2001 release from WNP-II 2-GW BWR was 4.2, which is well matched to the expected results.

Nuclear Reactor Startup

During the startup of a nuclear reactor the ¹³⁵Xe builds quickly compared to ¹³³Xe because the shorter half-lives of the ¹³⁵Te and ¹³³Te grandparents and ¹³⁵I and ¹³³I parents that feed into their respective production. This coupled with an increase in gas leakage due to thermal stressing of the fuel rods leads to high ratios and high concentrations of both xenon isotopes. The reactor is slowly ramped up over a 10-day period in 10 daily steps of 10%. Figure 6 shows the various ratios determined for a pressurized water reactor. It takes approximately 3 weeks to be within 10% of equilibrium for the ¹³⁵Xe/¹³³Xe ratio, more than 4 weeks for the ¹³³Xe/^{131m}Xe ratio to be in equilibrium and the ¹³³Xe/^{133m}Xe ratio is stable shortly after startup.

As the reactor comes up to full power, the production of 135 Xe is suppressed because of its extremely high neutron capture cross-section (2.6x10⁶ barns) and the 135 Xe/ 133 Xe ratio will drop to those levels indicated for a stable reactor in Figure 6. After the reactor has reached equilibrium the 135 Xe/ 133 Xe ratio is approximately 0.5 and the 135 Xe/ 133m Xe ratio is approximately 11. The release of additional 131m Xe, 133m Xe and 133 Xe and 135 Xe is further suppressed because the reactor/fuel rods have reached thermal equilibrium.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As more data are acquired from the several radioxenon monitoring stations currently operating analyses will be required to discriminate between reactor related radioxenon and that expected from possible underground nuclear detonations. Analyses to date indicate that concentration levels, multiple radioxenon isotopes in a single sample, the presence of ^{133m}Xe and several isotopic ratios will all be good indicators of clandestine underground nuclear explosions and the combination of two or more of these measures will provide strong evidence of such activities.

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Figure 1. Freiburg ¹³³Xe concentration results for the period January 2000 to February 2001. Over 1100 samples were collected and measured during the test. The chart clearly indicates that for radioxenon measurement systems located in areas with large numbers of nuclear reactors high concentration of ¹³³Xe will be seen regularly.



Figure 2. Expected activity ratios for ¹³³Xe/¹³³mXe, ¹³³Xe/¹³³mXe and ¹³⁵Xe/¹³³Xe with respect to release time from a subsurface nuclear detonation and from an operating reactor. All of the reactor ratios are lower than the nuclear detonation ratios, and in some cases by several orders of magnitude for several days.



Channel Number

Figure 3. Gamma-ray spectrum of first reported environmental concentration measurement of ¹³⁵Xe along with ¹³³Xe. The lower red curve is the beta-gated gamma spectrum and the higher blue curve is the ungated gamma spectrum. This data was taken by the first prototype ARSA unit at the Environmental Monitoring Laboratory in New York City, 1997. The ¹³⁵Xe/¹³³Xe ratio for this sample was 0.13 that is indicative of a release from a stable reactor or a plume that has traveled large distances from either a reactor that was powering up or down.



Figure 4. A beta-gated gamma spectrum from ARSA obtained using the fission product gases produced by irradiating HEU with a PuBe neutron source. The two radioxenon isotopes ¹³³Xe and ¹³⁵Xe are present at 30 and 81-keV and 250-keV respectively.



Figure 5. Xenon-135 concentration with respect to time after a full power shutdown of PWR reactor. The increase is due to the lack of burn up caused by neutrons in the reactor core.



Figure 6. Radioxenon ratios during startup of a pressure-water reactor. The two data points represent the measured ratios for the Freiburg and Richland radioxenon samples.